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Introduction
The LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) won a landslide victory in the general election in December,
2012. Harshly criticizing the DPJ (The Democratic Party of Japan)­led government since its great vic­
tory at the election in 2009, Shinzo Abe and his leading LDP titled its campaign policy ‘We will re­
store Japan’ (Nippon o torimodosu). In the socio­political context after the 3/11 Earthquake in 2011
(Higashinihon Daishinsai), the political message aiming to recover from the damages and regain the
bright future of Japan seems to have appealed to the majority of Japanese.
In this article I try to analyze the relationship between the political term of ‘restore’ and the cul­
tural term of ‘nostalgia’ that has been seen in Japan’s popular cultural scene for almost two decade.
Through the discussions in the paper it will be clarified that there exists strong affinity between the
two key terms characterizing the present political­cultural scene in Japan. Backed by the popular senti­
ment longing for the heyday of Showa era ‘(it is called ‘Showa Nostalgia’), Abe and his LDP suc­
ceeded in gaining the majority of seats in the National Diet. It seems to be possible to regard the sense
of loss that is widely shared among the public as a common factor discerned in both Abe’s politics of
restoration and the ‘Showa Nostalgia’ in popular culture.
Considering the ideological implication of the ‘We will restore Japan’ campaign, this paper aims
to investigate the socio­historical background of ‘political­cultural nostalgia’ seen in contemporary Ja­
pan and critically assess its impasse from the viewpoint of the melancholic nationalism rising in the
age of globalization.
Victory of LDP in the 2012 general election
At the election held in December 2012, the LDP gained an overwhelmingly victory and DPJ’s
seats in the House of Representatives were drastically reduced. It meant the end of the government led
by DPJ since the election in 2009. Even though the majority of the nation seemed not to fully agree
with the policies of the LDP (especially their long­lasting ambition of rewriting of the Constitution),
the choice they made was ‘preferring LDP to DPJ or The Third Parties (dai sankyoku)’. While the de­
feat of leading DPJ was easily predicted, the magnitude of the LDP victory was somehow surprising
for the public. Many scholars and critics have discussed and analyzed the results of the election. Some
of them pointed out that the majority of the electorates just showed their disdain for the DPJ, which
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does not necessarily mean their truthful support for the LDP.
Of course the large number of policies that the LDP focused on and debated: the economic crisis,
the gloomy prospect for social security owing to the rising rate of elderly population, the threat to na­
tional security caused by the territorial conflict between Japan and China, North and South Korea were
significant factors. It may be true to say that the LDP were seen by the electorate as being more likely
to tackle these emergent agendas than DPJ who was in power in the past three years and failed to ad­
dress any of them adequately.
However, it seems that not only political but also cultural aspects are important in considering
why the people preferred LDP to DPJ at the election in 2012. In this paper I would clarify the so­
ciocultural background that enabled the victory of LDP at the general election in 2012 from the view­
point of prevalent sentiment of ‘Showa Nostalgia’ in Japan.
Ambiguous Message of ‘We will restore Japan’
The campaign slogan of LDP during the election in 2012 was ‘Restoring Japan (Nippon o torimo-
dos)’. It might be easy to understand what the slogan means in the context of Japanese society at that
time, but how to restore Japan is not necessarily clear enough. A majority of the people may admit
that Japan should retrace its steps in recent times to recover some of its strength and integrity, and to
take something back, but no one can tell exactly what that something is and what restoration would be
like. Even after reading the documents LDP issued for the election campaign, we cannot understand
how to restore Japan in each area of economy, education, diplomacy and public safety. The political
objectives that the LDP promised were too general to be specifically implemented.
However, the LDP’s message stressing ‘restoration’ seems to have appealed to the public and it
gained for them the majority of seats in the House of Representative. One of the reasons why they
successfully gained the support from the public is that many Japanese people were damaged, not only
physically but also psychologically, by the huge earthquake occurred on March 11 in 2011. After the
Higashinihon Daishinsai (East Japan Huge Earthquake), the majority of the Japanese people consid­
ered that Japan should recover from the enormous damages caused by this terrible natural disaster. In
the light of such devastation the word restoration could easily invoke the necessity and urgency of re­
construction required in a socio­economic context. Even if the content of the LDP’s political pro­
gramme was neither concrete nor specific, the slogan of ‘restoring Japan’ was somehow appealing for
the public suffering the strong sense of loss after the earthquake.
Anatomy of ‘restoring Japan’
The message that LDP proposed to the public at the 2012 election was easy to understand1). Its
rhetoric is very simple and clear. However, it was not concrete enough to be a party’s ‘manifesto’,
which is expected to be a political platform that should be completed when the party gets the majority
of the seats in the National Diet.
Why could the LDP win the public’s support without having the concrete manifesto? To analyze
this point it is useful to pay attention to semantics of the slogan of ‘restoring Japan’. It seems that ‘We
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will restore Japan’ campaign was successful not only in its direct meaning, but also in its ideological
connotation of ‘national restoration’.
As a denotative meaning, the word ‘restoring’ relates to the four areas; economy, education, di­
plomacy and safety, each of which has faced troublesome problems theses days. At the same time, the
term of ‘restoring’ implies at least three tasks that the LDP aims to accomplish. The first is to give the
LDP the power of government. During the election campaign in 2012 LDP harshly criticized the
DPJ’s three years in power and it is easy to understand the term ‘restoring’ for them is closely related
to their political objectives and to win the majority of seats in the House of Representatives so that
they may organize government.
The second is related to the long­lasting economic crisis of Japan since the breakdown of the
bubble economy in early 1990s. As was often said by economists and critics in the early 2000s, the
decade of 1990s was called ‘the lost decade (ushinawareta ju-nen)’ in Japanese postwar history owing
to its economic downfall. The following decade has suffered the lasting instability failing to recover
from the economic crisis. People were beginning to refer to this as ‘the lost two decades (ushina-
wareta niju-nen)’ of Japan when describing the socio­economic conditions of Japan in 21st century.
Keeping the long­lasting economic problems sine 1990s in mind, we can interpret the connotation of
‘restoring’ as taking back the economic prosperity that Japan once enjoyed in the heyday of the post­
war era.
The third concerns the postwar political regime of Japan. For those who stand by the side of
rightwing conservatism, the postwar regime of Japan is regarded as being ‘compelled’ to Japanese na­
tion by GHQ through its occupational policy for postwar Japan. Therefore, the political ambition of
conservative politicians like Shinzo Abe is to rewrite the Japan’s constitution anew so that Japan can
be a self­made nation. He has enthusiastically proclaimed that we have to restore the Constitution to
Japanese nation.
Considering the political context concerning the legitimacy of the postwar regime of Japan, the
connotation of ‘restoring’ is more historical and ideological. For Abe and those who share his right­
wing nationalistic ideology, the word of ‘restoring’ might mean the true restoration of sovereignty so
that Japan can have its own military power legitimized by the Constitution. This sort of interpretation
of the term restoration is not so insignificant as we have already seen the aftermath of LDP’s gaining
the majority of the seats in the National Diet in which they harshly tried to implement several policies
to change the political­military foundations of postwar Japan.
Cultural background and atmosphere accepting the LDP’s message
As pointed out early, it is often said that the 1990s and 2000s are the lost decades because Japan
failed to recover from the economic damage faced after the bubble economy in 1980s. The long­
lasting period of hardship for Japan made the people feel that they had lost what had been its greatest
achievements after the World War II. The most prominent aspects are the economic prosperity realized
in postwar Japan. The economic miracle Japan made in recovering from damages of the war was so
drastic that it astonished the world in the decades of the 60s and 70s. It enabled the nation of Japan to
be proud of herself and diminish the historical trauma of defeat at the WWII. Therefore, for Japan and
its people losing the economic prosperity was not only economic but also a socio­political matter of
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great concern. As the economic downfall continued into the 1990s and 2000s, the socio­cultural at­
mosphere in Japanese society became more and more gloomy even though the GDP of Japan was still
the second biggest in the world in those periods of time.
During this time when people had the sense of something lost, we have seen as a consequence
the phenomena of ‘Showa Nostalgia’ in the popular cultural scene. In 1990s and 2000s, the socio­
political conditions of present Heisei Japan was regarded to be problematic and miserable in compari­
son to those of past Showa Era, especially its 30s (1955­1964). In the discourse of ‘Showa Nostalgia’
the past history of postwar Japan is excessively romanticized. ‘Showa Nostalgia’ often described the
period of Showa as the time when Japanese people were most content with the socio­economic condi­
tions and hoped for the future development, even though they were not wealthy enough at that time.
As many critics have pointed out, the image of Showa depicted in the media discourse is not what the
time of Showa exactly was. It is apparently selective and sometimes contradicts with the historical
facts. However, for people now living in the era of Heisei the Japan of the past holds a nostalgic fas­
cination and made it a key element in popular culture for almost two decades.
Politics of ‘Showa Nostalgia’
It is apparent that the media representation of the 30s of Showa is not necessarily objective (in
the sense of social science) in its description of the socio­cultural conditions of postwar Japan. How­
ever, the positive image of Showa Japan is pervasively shared and praised among the public at large
in the time of Heisei Japan. Not historical truth but imaginative memory is important when the people
talk about what the past time of Showa was like. Naïve but humane trust for other people and the
strong ambition for future development depicted in the media discourse on Showa seems to function
as a socio­cultural mechanism to compensate the ‘sense of loss’ for the nation living in the desperate
time of Heisie.
One of the most typical examples of ‘Showa Nostalgia’ is the film trilogy of ‘Always, Sunset of
Third Street (Sancho me no yuuhi)’. The time of Showa the films describe (the period of Showa 33­
39: 1958­1964) seems to be very peaceful, joyful and full of dream and vitality. Even though they
were not wealthy enough, people were helping to each other in the harmonious community in down­
town Tokyo.
One of the characteristics discernable in the phenomena of ‘Showa Nostalgia’ is that not only the
generations of people who actually lived the time of 30s of Showa, but also the younger generation
born long after then seem to have the sense of nostalgia watching ‘Always, Sunset of Third Street’.
This fact tells that the ‘Showa Nostalgia’ is rather simulacra in the sense of Jean Baudrillard’s2) than
the historical fact in that people who have not experienced the time of Showa can enjoy the feeling of
nostalgia for that time. It is the nostalgia for which one has never ever had in the history. One of the
reasons why the younger generation seeks ‘Showa Nostalgia’ is that they (believe they) can enjoy the
brighter future in the mediated representation of Showa. According to the ‘Showa Nostalgia’ the future
was so bright and hopeful that people living in the 30s of Showa could unite together for realizing
better life for all. For the younger generations the retrospective image of Showa Japan is of historical
context. As they were yet to be born at that time, their familiarity is selective. The hopeful, dream­like
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future at that time, which ‘Showa Nostalgia’ repeatedly praises, was realized as the present when they
now live. But ironically enough, in the era of Heisei it is almost impossible for the young population
to have the hopeful prospect for future they will have.
Affinity between ‘Showa Nostalgia’ and ‘Restoring Japan’
After considering why the LDP could win the general election in 2012 with respect to how the
public has perceived the socio­economic conditions of the ‘lost two decades’, we can see a subtle af­
finity between the sentiment of Nostalgia and the politics of Restoration. Though not clearly articu­
lated in ideological messages or speeches of political leaders, it is not so difficult to discern the logical
connection between ‘backward­looking’ nostalgia and ‘forward­looking’ restoration in political dis­
course. Shinzo Abe’s book of ‘utsukushii kuni e’ (towards a beautiful nation)3) shows the relationship
between the two. Abe seems to be fascinated with the films of ‘Always’ because it typically represents
the virtue of Japanese that is fading in the present era of Heisie. When he talks about ‘a beautiful na­
tion’ that Japan is to be in the future, it actually means that Japanese people should reclaim what they
have lost during the period of postwar. Here we can see a political affinity between the hawkish con­
servative politics of Abe’s and the nostalgic popular sentiment concerning the ‘lost Japanese­ness’.
It could be said that one of the reasons why LDP succeeded in gaining support from the majority
of electorate is that they somehow channelized the cultural sentiment of nostalgia into the political
arena where the ‘restoration’ is mystified.
Conflicts between Nostalgia and Abe’s Politics
While we can see the affinity between the cultural nostalgia and political conservatism in recent
Japanese politics, there also exists the potential tension between them. The sentiment of ‘Showa Nos­
talgia’ is basically backward­looking as it is based on the popular sentiment of remembering the hey­
day of postwar Japan. Though the younger generation seems to be fascinated by the brighter future
they can see in the media representation on Showa, the future they admire is actually ‘the future at
that time’, which chronologically is ‘the present we now have’. It is nothing but the phenomena of
‘back to the future’ in imaginatively enjoying an alternative vision of possible future that is different
from what actually became reality.
Contrastingly, Abe’s politics of ‘Restoring Japan’ is more mundane and realistically based vision
of the ideal nation that Japan should become. While he shows his sympathy with the ‘Showa Nostal­
gia’, his political vision is forward­looking in its ambitious attempt to reshape the postwar regime of
Japan. In his political ideology of ‘utsukushii kuni’, the sentiment of ‘Showa Nostalgia’ is utilized for
envisioning the image of coming future that we should have through ‘Restoring Japan’. Not just to re­
member the past enjoying the memory of heyday of postwar Japan, but to in fact become what is to
be ‘a beautiful nation’ of the future inheriting Japanese virtues embodied in the 30s of Showa. This is
the political objective that Abe’s politics aims to accomplish. It is quite different whether the senti­
ment of nostalgia is consumed and enjoyed for its own sake, or channelized and mobilized for other
purposes.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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Abe and other members of his cabinet might recognize the potential tension rising up from those
who sympathize with the cultural phenomena of ‘Showa Nostalgia’, at the same time they seem to be
careful not to stimulate the public so that the concerns about Abe’s hawkish policy will not occur.
This is one of the reasons why Abe’s government has been so keen to implement seemingly drastic
economic policies, which is often called ‘Abenomics’, since their coming back to power in the Nationl
Diet as a result of the general election in 2012. As far as the public’s concerns are directed towards
the economics, the potential tension lurking between the nostalgic sentiments and hawkish nationalism
can be nicely managed. It seems that utilizing the banner of ‘Abenomics’ they skillfully try to camou­
flage their hawkish faces so that the relatively high popularity of Abe’s government and LDP is ex­
tended.
For Abe and LDP to accomplish such a political strategy, the agenda of hosting the 2020 Olym­
pic Games in Tokyo could be utilized in channeling the sentiment of nostalgia into future­looking
politics they advance in seemingly neither nationalistic nor hawkish way. Hosting the Olympic Games
in 2020 seems to be a nostalgic repetition of Tokyo Olympics in 1964, which was one of the most
proud national event of postwar Japan. While those who tried to host the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo
promised that hosting the Games fosters the economic recovery from damages caused by the 3/11
Earthquake, how it actually works has been not clear at all. However, as far as the festive mega­events
like Olympics are concerned, the politics of Abe and LDP is naively welcomed by the majority of
Japanese people backed by the sentiment of ‘Showa Nostalgia’.
LDP won again at the following general elections of the Upper House in 2013 and the House of
Common in 2014. It means that the political condition for LDP to rewrite the present Constitution be­
came more feasible. Actually, unless they dared to change the Constitution, Abe’s government and
LDP could drastically reform the basic political­military relationship with USA. In September 2015,
the National Diet passed the law concerning the peace and security of Japanese nation enabling Japan
to enact the collective self­defense with USA, even though many scholars and citizens criticized it in­
sisting that such a law is unconstitutional. As is well known, Article 9 forbids Japan to fight with
other nations and it has had a symbolic status in legitimizing the peace of postwar Japan. However, as
a result of the recent political challenges initiated by Abe’s government seems to drastically undermine
the normative foundations of postwar regime of Japan.
Difficulties of politics of ‘Restoring Japan’
At first glance, the combination of ‘Showa Nostalgia’ and LDP’s policy of ‘Restoring Japan’
seems to be compatible in its romanticized nationalistic orientation. However, there exists potential
tension and conflict between them. On the one hand the phenomena of cultural nostalgia consumed by
the media audience does not necessarily contradict with the postwar political regime of Japan (often
called ‘sengo-minshyushyugi’ in Japanese). While the discourse of nostalgia laments over the lost
Japanese­ness recognized in present Heisei by contrast to the time of Showa, it seems to be loyal to
the legitimacy of postwar regime, even though it often avoids talking about the politics in general. In
contrast, Shinzo Abe’s conservative politics apparently declares to leave the postwar regime behind in
order to rebuild the nation of Japan as a ‘new and beautiful country’. It is probable that Prime Minis­
ter Abe and his government will start the process of revising the present Constitution in case that they
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can get another victory at coming general election in 2016. However, it might be not so easy for LDP
and its coalition parties to keep the political support from the public unless they can invent another
political strategy to tame a profound concern rising from the strong public support for the ideal of
peace that is embodied in Article 9.
Results of a series of survey that Yomiuri Shinbun released after the comeback of LDP to the
power (Yomiuri Newspaper: 20/04/2013; 15/03/2014; 23/03/2015)4) show that the percentage of the
people who support the policy of ‘revising the Constitution’ is 51%; 42%; 51% among the whole
population. This number is remaining fairly stable around the half of the population over the last few
years. At the beginning of the 2000s, the percentage of people supporting that policy was less than 30.
In that sense the public opinion in Japan is becoming more affirmative for the revision of the present
Constitution. However, the public opinion concerning how and on what articles the Constitution may
be re­examined is diverse, and the survey questionnaire doesn’t sufficiently specify that point. It only
asks the respondents to select the topics they think may be considered for Constitutional revision. The
result is as follows; having own military power to protect the nation (32%; 27%; 39%), keeping the
good balance of public budgets (29%; 25%; 44%), division of roles between state and local govern­
ment (27%; 21%; 30%), right to live in sound environments (25%; 25%; 32%), etc.
It is widely recognized that the Japanese people are very sensitive about whether they should
change Article 9 or not, believing that having its own military power for protecting the nation from its
potential enemies may increase the risk of becoming involved in a future war. This sensibility is also
shown in the results of Yomiuri’s survey. The percentage of the respondents supporting the given
choice that we should cope with the present situation not changing but interpretatively applying Arti­
cle 9 is 40 in 2013; 43 in 2014; 40 in 2015. That of supporting the opinion that we should change Ar­
ticle 9 so that we can adjust ourselves to the changing conditions of the contemporary world is respec­
tively 36; 30; 35. The result of Yomiuri’s survey shows that about a half of the population seems to
be affirmative in revising the Constitution. However, as far as Article 9 is concerned, public opinion
shows a somehow ambivalent attitude towards its revision.
More interestingly, the majority of the people in Japan enthusiastically support the ideal of re­
nouncing war embodied in the paragraph 1 of Article 9. A series of survey of Yomiuri indicate that
the number of the respondents against any revision is very high (74%; 76%; 84%). That of supporting
the choice of ‘we need to revise’ is only 19%; 17%; 14% respectively. Concerning the paragraph 2 of
Article 9, which concerns the ‘not having the forces’ and ‘not recognizing the belligerency’, the per­
centage of the respondents supporting that ‘we need to revise’ is 44 in 2013; 39 in 2014; 46 in 2015.
That of ‘we don’t need to’ is 45; 52; 50 respectively. Carefully reading through the results of a series
of survey on the matter of revising the Constitution, we can recognize the general trend of the public
opinion concerning how we should revise it. While about a half of Japanese people think the Constitu­
tion should be revised considering the changing conditions surrounding Japan, the majority of the na­
tion strongly support the ideal of peace and renouncing war declared in Article 9. It is not so difficult
to point out a logical inconsistency or contradiction discernable in the public opinion on what and how
we should revise the Constitution. Logically speaking, it is impossible to revise the paragraph 2 with­
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out changing the paragraph 1 of Article 9. However, for the purpose of discussion in this paper it is
much important to recognize the dilemma of people who on the one hand wish to revise the Constitu­
tion and on the other hand remain loyal to the ideal of peace.
Keeping the above­mentioned popular sentiment prevailing among the public in mind, it seems
apparent that the law formally allowing the collective self­defense that was passed in 2015 basing on
the government’s interpretation of Article 9 is for many people almost synonymous with revising the
Constitution. For those who cling to the normative ground of Japan’s postwar regime, what Prime
Minister Abe and his government have done and will do utilizing their political power is nothing but
the total abolishment of ‘sengo-minshyushyugi’ and heralds the coming of another dawn of wartime
that threatens the peace and security of ordinary people living in Japan.
Nostalgia or Melancholia?
At the more philosophical level, Abe’s politics of ‘Restoring Japan’ seems to have its own prob­
lems. As I analyzed in the preceding sections, the feeling of ‘loss’ is a common factor that combines
the cultural sentiment of nostalgia with the political orientation of restoration. However, what the
sense of loss actually means is quite different in each case.
In case of ‘Showa Nostalgia’, something lost is ‘visible’ or ‘visualized’ in its mediated represen­
tations. As pointed out earlier in this paper, the media’s representation of the heyday of the Showa era
is selective and narcissistic. However, it certainly refers to specific historical events that were signifi­
cant at that time (for example, hosting the huge national events like Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964,
World Expo in Osaka 1970, and Sapporo Winter Olympic Games in 1972). As the heyday of Showa
has passed and Japan began to face the troublesome time in the Heisei era, many people longed for
the peace and prosperity they enjoyed in the era of Showa. This is a typical phenomenon of nostalgia
in that we can discern the psychic symptom of looking back to the past with the feeling of being lost
and far away from ‘home’.
Contrasted to that, in cease of the politics of restoration PM Abe and the LDP enhance what has
been lost is more imaginative and ideological, even though they stress to restore it through their hawk­
ish policies. For Abe and his colleagues who share his political ideology it might be too clear to be
questioned whether something authentically Japanese was repressed in the history of postwar Japan or
not. They also seem to be fully confident that a main cause of the loss of Japanese­ness is the postwar
regime that was ‘imposed’ on Japan by GHQ. However, as a lot of historical researches on the process
of postwar occupation of Japan have clarified, the political relationship and struggle between Japan
and the occupational power was more tangled and complicated5). It was not so simple and one­sided as
Abe and his colleagues seem to think it was. Moreover, we can raise the question whether the lost
Japanese­ness Abe stresses to restore had actually existed before being repressed and lost through the
occupational policy. In other words it might be probable that the authentic Japanese­ness the politics
of restoration enthusiastically underscore is rather an ideological construct than a historical entity. It
might be nothing but a typical case of the ‘invention of tradition’ as Hobsbawm depicted more than
thirty years before in his discussion of modern nationalism6). If the case is like this, the lost Japanese­
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ness for Abe’s politics is, I suppose, a subject of not nostalgia but melancholia.
As is well known, Sigmund Freud formulated the difference between melancholia and mourning7).
The characteristic of melancholia is that those who suffer from it cannot tell exactly what was lost in
their psychological condition of grief. Patients of melancholia cannot mourn for that lost something
because they don’t know what they actually have lost. As well as the case of the patient of melancho­
lia, it seems to be hard for the politics of Abe’s to fully mourn the lost Japanese­ness because they
cannot tell precisely what sort of authentic Japanese­ness we have lost in the postwar history of Japan.
As a result of it, the more support the politics of ‘Restoring Japan’ gets among the public, the deeper
the melancholic feeling of discontent becomes, even though people can temporarily celebrate the na­
tionalistic self­pride of ‘restoration’.
In order for patients who suffer from melancholia to mourn what they actually lost, confronting
their past may be on recourse, even though it may be very hard to face. The same thing could be said
in case of the political­cultural nostalgia we observe in contemporary Japan. If Japanese people can
have the courage to look objectively at its colonial and post­colonial history in Asia, they might be
able to escape from the long­lasting melancholia combined with the narcissistic nationalism. However,
the recent political tension and conflict seen between Japan and neighboring Asian nations tells the se­
vere fact that Japan is rather inclined to inward­looking narcissism than sincerely facing the traumatic
past in the East Asian region. As far as Japan desperately aims to restore the ‘lost Japanese­ness’ only
in its own way, it will miss the opportunity to encounter the Asia with which Japan is to make a new
and lasting relationship in the coming future.
Out of the Legacy of Nostalgia
After gaining the majority of seats at the general elections in 2012, 2013 and 2014, Abe’s gov­
ernment has tried to implement several statist policies that underscore emergent needs for the stronger
leadership by the government. Establishment of Japanese version of NSC (National Security Council)
in 2014 is a typical case of those political endeavors. However, the hawkish policies that Abe’s cabi­
net enforces seem to be not so enthusiastically supported as in the case of ‘Restoring Japan’ politics
by the general public. While the rate of public support for Abe’s government has been relatively high
and stable in comparison to the preceding ones led by DPJ, the main cause of supporting it is that
many people still expect the success of the Abenomics. What the Abenomics promises the public to
achieve is the rapid recovery and dynamic growth of Japanese economy through the active economic­
financial interventions initiated by the government and Bank of Japan. Such a political­economic pol­
icy reminds us of the heyday of Showa era when the governmental economic policy was so optimistic
that the people could believe in the prospect for economic growth in the coming future. Keeping this
in mind, it is not so difficult to depict a sort of shadow of ‘Showa Nostalgia’ in the ideology of
Abenomics. Therefore, as far as the present economic conditions seems to be not so gloomy, the pub­
lic support for Abe’s government is somehow guaranteed. But it doesn’t necessarily mean that the
Abe’s statist policies have been smoothly accepted without dissents.
Actually, when they arrogantly passed the law enabling Japan to enact the collective self­defense
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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with USA in September 2015, the wide­ranging protest movements against the law spread all over the
nation. It surely suggests the fact that the public opinion is divided with respect to how they asseess
the statist policies enforced by Prime Minister Abe and LDP.
Observing the aftermath of LDP’s victories at the last three general elections we could judge that
while the Abe’s government is in the position where they can realize their political ambitions with
ease, at the same time the prospect of public support for them is neither stable nor predictable depend­
ing on what sort of policies they persuade the public to accept. When we pay attentions to how and on
what issues the Tokyo Olympic Games in 2020 is recently discussed, the impasse of political­cultural
nostalgia will become much clear to understand. On the one hand, hosting the 2020 Olympic Games
in Tokyo aims to revive Japan, remembering the previous one held in 1964 when Japan was just to
enter the economic heyday of postwar period. In other words, the objective of the Tokyo 2020 Olym­
pics is projecting the ‘Showa Nostalgia’ into the Heisei’s future. However, on the other hand in the
process of preparing the Olympic Games we have already faced a series of troublesome incidents like
the rising budget for rebuilding a new national stadium, the suspecious case of selecting the main em­
blem for the Tokyo 2020 Games. Facing those scandals concerning the Tokyo Olympics it is often
pointed out that more transparency and compliance are definitely needed in implementing the mega­
events like Olympic Games. Moreover, critique of lack of transparency and compliance also illumi­
nates the fact that we have long lived in the political­cultural legacies in which the secrecy has domi­
nated in the politics of national events. While the TOCOG’s (The Tokyo Organising Committee of the
Olympic and Paralympic Games) official declaration of socio­cultural significance of hosting the 2020
Games is ‘leaving positive legacies in sport and other various fields for Japan and around the world
even after 2020’,8) we are now facing a continuing legacy that prevents us from getting out of the nos­
talgia in which we just keep on dreaming an ever­unrealized dream. What we should complete is not
to self­proudly reproduce, but to self­reflectively reassess the political­cultural nostalgia in which Japa­
nese people indulge themselves for more than two decades. It is time for us to leave behind not the
postwar regime per se, but the legacy of political­cultural nostalgia.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
８）The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, Tokyo 2020 Games Foundation Plan, Chapter
6: Action & Legacy. https://tokyo 2020.jp/en/plan/gfp/Tokyo_2020_Games_Foundation_Plan_EN.pdf
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ABSTRACT
The LDP won a landslide victory in the general election in December, 2012.
Harshly criticizing the DPJ­led government since its great victory in 2009, Shinzo Abe
and his leading LDP titled its campaign policy ‘We will restore Japan’ (Nippon o tori-
modosu). In the socio­political context after the 3/11 Earthquake in 2011 (Higashinihon
Daishinsai), the political message aiming to recover from the damage and regain a
bright future of Japan seems to have appealed to the majority of Japanese.
It is clear that the political term of ‘restore’ has strong affinity with the cultural
term of ‘nostalgia’ that has been seen in Japan’s popular cultural scene for almost two
decades. Backed by the popular sentiment longing for the heyday of Showa era (called
‘Showa Nostalgia’), Abe and his LDP succeeded in gaining the majority of seats in the
National Diet. It seems to be possible to regard the sense of loss that is widely shared
among the public as a common factor discerned in both Abe’s politics of restoration
and the Showa nostalgia in popular culture.
Considering the ideological implication of the ‘We will restore Japan’ campaign,
this paper tries to clarify the socio­historical background of ‘political­cultural nostalgia’
seen in contemporary Japan and critically assess its impasse from the viewpoint of the
melancholic nationalism rising in the age of globalization.
Key Words: ‘Showa Nostalgia’, ‘Restoring Japan’, Article 9 of the Constitution, mel­
ancholia
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